6 Months in the Office: Revisit Keir with Southeast Asia
- Vanndasambath Chhuon
- Feb 26
- 4 min read
Updated: Feb 26
Prime Minister Keir Starmer victory in the UK general election on July 4, 2024, and has now been in office at 10 Downing Street for six months. This is good time to look back and revisit Labour's foreign policy concerning Southeast Asia. How is it progressing and What's next?
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Prime Minister Keir Starmer won the UK general election on 4 July 2024, and it is now marking his six-month stay at 10 Downing Street. It is worth revisiting Labour's foreign policy regarding Southeast Asia or ASEAN.
The UK’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia under Labour “Britain Reconnected” strategy which emphasizes economic partnership, eyes-on security, balancing approach with China, and promoting progressive value and soft-power. Under Keir, the UK’s increasing presence in its wider Indo-Pacific context largely shapes ASEAN to be more important. Yet, the mood of foreign policy in this 10-nation region is geared towards economic opportunity, and security-wise considerations.
Keir’s priority in Southeast Asia would focus on economic expansion, enhancing the UK’s influence, promoting an international rules-based order, and its areas of expertise such as sustainable development, human rights, and climate change. While ASEAN would aim to expand economic options, foster regional stability, balance diplomacy, and establish diversified partnerships.
The UK agenda under Keir over the past semester regarding the Southeast Asia has remained unchanged compared to the Conservatives, focusing on implementing the Plan of Action they agreed on during the Cambodia’s ASEAN Chair back in 2022. According to David Lammy, over 80% of the POA has shown marked progress, and the possibility of studying the next POA will be on the table during Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship and Singapore’s upcoming Chair.
Over the past six months, official visits between British and ASEAN member states have consistently increased along two-way official lines. High-level visits have occurred from Cabinet Ministers to the Prime Minister or Head of State in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, excluding the UK Foreign Secretary's attendance at the 57th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Vientiane. Meanwhile, visits involving Ministers of State and members of diplomatic missions have maintained strategic dialogue and agreements at the bilateral level.
Despite these points, ASEAN still appears as a lower priority for Keir. It has been challenging to hear the term “ASEAN” since Keir took office unless it come to bilateral visit between ASEAN head of states.
However, efforts are being made to enhance engagement at the foreign diplomacy level, particularly through proactive collaboration between the UK and ASEAN, both bilaterally and via the UK Mission to ASEAN. The latest ASEAN-UK Joint Ministerial Statement, issued in Vientiane in July 2024, emphasized the UK's commitment to actively engaging with ASEAN. This commitment aims to benefit the people and enhance living conditions in the region while promoting the UK's presence at the grassroots level and fostering diplomatic engagement in areas of expertise. As ASEAN and the UK expand their influence within the community, there is a growing focus on building connections among diplomats, academia, and youth.
Effort can and cannot be determined by fact that those regions’ relationship is progressing, but we must consider where to improve.
Labour Party must increase its strategic presence to enhance the Southeast Asia as opportunities allow. The UK ranks sixth among eleven dialogue partners in terms of strategic relevance to ASEAN, surpassing countries such as Australia, Russia, India, Canada, and New Zealand. This refers to the old glass in new battles that appeared in the UK's existing presence with the EU before Brexit.
The concepts of “Reconnected Britain” and “Global Britain” still serve as motivations for the UK to establish its presence by injecting both soft and hard power on the international stage. While Foreign Secretary David’s “progressive realism” also reflecting the UK can expect to partner with many other collaborators to pursue progressive ends.
Yet dealing with ASEAN requires effort; the UK will need to assess its position to manage the risks, challenge the prevailing dynamics, and navigate towards the critical flashpoints intensifying in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly dealing with South China Sea. ASEAN is a transactional region, where individual state interests occasionally overlap with collective interests, so choosing sides is an option to consider. A careful balance is necessary, much like the approach taken by the Sunak administration regarding China. The situation could prove even challenging, with recent unexpected decision made by the US under Trump 2.0 administrative, yet it also presents an opportunity for Keir to play a crucial role in fostering trust within the region. What the UK can do is support and engage with the initiatives they advocate for.
What is recalled as the next plan for Keir is managing effective engagement with Southeast Asia by fostering mutual collaboration, ensuring capacity training and building trust in regional, bilateral, and multilateral platforms through various aspects concerning development and security. Investing in such a strategic position should be on the list, as the UK has laid the groundwork for an international rules-based order and maritime activity in Southeast Asia. It should be about time for the UK to progress from non-traditional security to traditional security.
The first six months are short for making any hypotheses, but they can be seen as a staging post in which we can set the groundwork for exploring this region and understanding UK's position toward it. The UK's engagement in the broader Indo-Pacific still allows ASEAN to remain an important arena for projecting influence, advancing economic interests, and shaping norms and values for Global Britain.
The opinions shared by the contributors and in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the institution.
Vanndasambath Chhuon is the General Coordinator of the ASEAN-UK Young Leaders Initiative and the Deputy Director of the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies, a foreign policy think tank based in Phnom Penh.
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